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THE OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL AND THE FATAL
FLAW: "THEY ARE LEFT TO TWIST IN THE WIND"
ABRAHAM DASH*
The independent counsel statute' lapsed onJune 30, 1999, possi-
bly forever.2 The concept of an Office of Independent Counsel
(OIC) emerged in 1978 as a result of the constitutional trauma of
Watergate.3 The statute had a five-year "sunset" provision,4 and was
reauthorized in 1982,' 1987,6 and 1994.7 The demise of the indepen-
dent counsel law was a direct result of the investigation of President
Clinton-indeed, a legacy of that administration.
So, it is ironic that when President Clinton signed the
reauthorization of the law in 1994, he stated:
I am pleased to sign into law S. 24, the reauthorization
of the Independent Counsel Act. This law, originally passed
in 1978, is a foundation stone for the trust between the Gov-
ernment and our citizens. It ensures that no matter what
party controls the Congress or the executive branch, an inde-
pendent, nonpartisan process will be in place to guarantee
the integrity of public officials and ensure that no one is
above the law.
Regrettably, this statute was permitted to lapse when its
reauthorization became mired in a partisan dispute in the
Congress. Opponents called it a tool of partisan attack
against Republican Presidents and a waste of taxpayer funds.
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. B.S., University of Ne-
braska; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994).
2. The Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, which was signed into law
on June 30, 1994, amended 28 U.S.C. § 599 by making the Independent Counsel Act "sun-
set" on June 30, 1999. Pub. L. No. 103-270, § 2, 108 Stat. 732, 732 (1994) ("Section 599 of
title 28, United States Code, is amended by striking '1987' and inserting '1994.'").
3. See S. REP. No. 103-101, at 5-6 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 748, 749 (dis-
cussing the origins of the independent counsel statute).
4. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 598, 92 Stat. 1824, 1873
(1978) ("This chapter shall cease to have effect five years after the date of the enactment of
this chapter .... .").
5. Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039
(1983).
6. Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat.
1293 (1987).
7. Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat.
732 (1994).
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It was neither. In fact, the independent counsel statute has
been in the past and is today a force for Government integ-
rity and public confidence.
This new statute enables the great work of Government
to go forward ... with the trust of its citizens assured.
It is my hope that both political parties would stand be-
hind those great objectives. This is a good bill that I sign
into law today-good for the American people and good for
their confidence in our democracy. 8
By 1999, the President had done an about-face and the "good
bill" that was "a force for Government integrity and public confi-
dence" was now considered by the President and many in his party a
tool of partisan attack against a Democratic president and a waste of
taxpayer funds. The Democrats had come around to the position of
many Republicans, who, prior to 1994, had viewed the OIC as an en-
emy of Republican presidents.
What is it that would turn such a "good law" into a fatally flawed
statute with little support from either party, from the news media, or
from the general public? There has been a large amount of literature
written on the independent counsel statute, some in defense of the
office, and many critical of the concept.9 One of the best critical anal-
yses of the OIC is, perhaps, Justice Scalia's dissent in Morrison v.
Olson.10
However well-reasoned the "pro" or "con" literature on the OIC
may be, it usually deals, for the most part, with constitutional ambigui-
ties and legalistic questions concerning that office. The fatal flaw that
has destroyed support for the independent counsel statute, and will
continue to make the OIC concept unworkable, however, is actually a
pragmatic, "real world" problem. Simply stated, there is no one, and
no institution, with a duty or inclination to defend independent coun-
sels when they are attacked in the public arena. The ambiguous con-
stitutional position of the OIC leaves it "twisting in the wind" when
attacked in the media.
Federal prosecutors-whether in a United States Attorney's Of-
fice or in the Department of Justice-usually operate in relative ano-
8. President William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the Independent Counsel
Reauthorization Act of 1994, 1994 PUB. PAPERS 1168, 1168-69 (June 30, 1994).
9. See, e.g, A Symposium on Morrison v. Olson: Addressing the Constitutionality of the Inde-
pendent Counsel Statute, 38 Am. U. L. REv. 255, 255-393 (1989); Sixty-Seventh Judicial Con-
ference of the Fourth Circuit, The Independent Counsel Process: Is It Broken and How Should It
Be Fixed?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1515, 1515-1598 (1997); Symposium, The Independent
Counsel Act: From Watergate to Whitewater and Beyond, 86 GEO. L.J. 2011, 2011-2389 (1998).
10. 487 U.S. 654, 697-734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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nymity. 11 In high-profile cases, there may be some critical press,
which is usually initiated by defense counsels. In those unusual cases,
however, the federal prosecutors, backed by the Department of Jus-
tice, are encouraged to defend their work. 12 Indeed, as federal of-
ficers, these prosecutors can depend on the Department of Justice
and, in some circumstances, the White House itself, to come to their
defense.1" Further, when necessary, the executive branch can con-
vince an impressive portion of the press and media to support its pros-
ecutors' efforts.14 Federal prosecutors know that they will not be left
"twisting in the wind" when, in the unusual case, they are subject to
unfair public attacks, particularly when those attacks are spearheaded
by the target of an investigation and their defense counsel.
The independent counsel, however, is a constitutional enigma.
Yes, it is a federal office, but not of the executive branch.' 5 Neither
the president nor the attorney general appoints the independent
counsel.16 It is a special court made up of members of the judiciary
that appoints these officials and spells out their jurisdiction.' 7 The
11. See Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., Wearing a Bull's Eye: Observations on the Differences Between
Prosecuting for a United States Attorney's Office and an Office of Independent Counsel, 29 STETSON
L. REV. 95, 96 (1999) (describing the author's career as an Assistant United States Attorney
and noting that the job was one that could be pursued "with relative anonymity").
12. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, Independent Counsel and the Charges of Leaking: A Brief
Case Study, 68 FoRDHam L. REV. 869, 870 (1999) (stating that Deputy Attorney General Eric
Holder encouraged prosecutors to speak freely with the press in cases that involve "high
profile white collar crime" and "well-known people").
13. For example, when the Microsoft antitrust complaint was filed (albeit not a crimi-
nal case), the Attorney General went public to defend the government attorneys against an
initial critical attack by Microsoft and its attorneys. See Attorney General Janet Reno, De-
partment of Justice Press Conference: Court Order on Microsoft Split, at http://
www.usdoj.gov:80/ag/speeches/2000/ 060700microsoftcom.htm (June 7, 2000) ("I'm
pleased that the court has ordered a strong, effective remedy to address the serious anti-
trust violations that Microsoft has committed.... I am so very proud of all the hard work
and efforts of this [DOJ Antitrust] team .. ").
14. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 11, at 127-28 (describing how U.S. attorneys use public
and media scrutiny to their advantage in conducting prosecutions); cf Samuel Dash, Inde-
pendent Counsel: No More, No Less a Federal Prosecutor, 86 GEO. L.J. 2077, 2083 (1988) (stating
that media "scrutiny is particularly intensive ... [when] the independent counsel's investi-
gation ... involves the President and the White House, [which are] subjects of irresistible
interest to print and electronic media").
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (1994) ("An independent counsel . . . shall have . . . full
power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions
and powers of the Department of Justice, the Attorney General, and any other officer or
employee of the Department of Justice, except that the Attorney General shall exercise
discretion or control as to those matters that specifically require the Attorney General's
personal action . . ").
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only relationship the executive branch has to the independent coun-
sel is that the attorney general may remove him from office for good
cause,"8 but even that is ultimately controlled by the judiciary.19 That
limited relationship does not, in the eyes of the executive branch,
make the independent counsel an executive figure or even an institu-
tional concern. Justice Scalia's Morrison v. Olson dissent effectively
summarizes why this is the case:
[T]he Court points out that the President, through his Attor-
ney General, has at least some control [over an independent
counsel] .... "Most importan [t]" among these controls, the
Court asserts, is the Attorney General's "power to remove the
counsel for 'good cause."' This is somewhat like referring to
shackles as an effective means of locomotion.2 0
Therefore, under the independent counsel statute, we have an
"Alice in Wonderland" situation; when the president is under investi-
gation, the United States Department ofJustice can be adversarial and
even hostile to its own federal officer, the independent counsel. 21
This naturally leads to public confusion and criticism.
In the past thirty years, there have been only three serious investi-
gations of the president-one by a traditional special prosecutor who
was appointed by an attorney general, and two by independent coun-
sels under the Independent Counsel Act. In 1972, Attorney General
Elliot Richardson appointed Archibald Cox as the special prosecutor
for the Watergate investigation. 22 In 1986, Lawrence Walsh was ap-
pointed independent counsel to investigate the Iran-Contra matter.23
18. See id. § 596(a)(1) ("An independent counsel . . . may be removed from office,
other than by impeachment and conviction, only by the personal action of the Attorney
General and only for good cause, physical or mental disability.... or any other condition
that substantially impairs the performance of such independent counsel's duties.").
19. See id. § 596(a) (3). While the attorney general can remove an independent coun-
sel for good cause, "[a] n independent counsel removed from office may obtain judicial
review of the removal in a civil action commenced in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia." Id.
20. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted) (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696).
21. See Kenneth Starr, Lessons Learned from the Recent Past, 8 GEO. MASON L. REv. 349,
350 (1999) (explaining why the attorney general has no incentive to support an indepen-
dent counsel).
22. KEN GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD COX: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION 240-41 (1997).
23. E.g., George Lardner Jr. & Howard Kurtz, Iran Inquiry Counsel Selected; Broad Man-
date Granted to Oklahoma City Attorney Walsh, WASH. PosT, Dec. 20, 1986, at Al; Philip She-
non, The White House in Crisis; Counsel Selected in Iran Arms Case; Given Wide Power, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 1986, § 1, at 1.
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And, on August 5, 1994, Kenneth Starr was appointed independent
counsel for the Whitewater investigation.
24
Since 1978 there have been several independent counsel investi-
gations of high-ranking federal officials. 25 However, with the possible
exception of one or two, none of those investigations aroused public
outcry and criticism from the White House as did the two presidential
investigations by Lawrence Walsh and Kenneth Starr. Whether inde-
pendent counsels are needed to investigate officials other than the
president and White House staff members is a debate to be left for
another time. However, it was presidential and White House staff mis-
deeds stemming from Watergate in 1978 that created the perceived
need for the OIC in the first place.26
The main (if not the only) purpose of the independent counsel
statute was to assure the public that any investigation of serious
charges against a president or members of the White House staff
would be fair, impartial, and complete.27 Unfortunately, in the only
two instances where independent counsels were used to investigate a
president-Walsh in Iran-Contra and Starr in Whitewater-the statute
failed to meet its purpose. The failure was not, however, the fault of
the independent counsels. The statute was doomed from the begin-
ning because of its fatal flaw.
Lawrence Walsh's appointment to investigate Iran-Contra "was
broadly welcomed and applauded."28 He had an excellent reputation
as a former federal judge, litigator, government servant, and President
of the American Bar Association. 29 Six years after Walsh's appoint-
24. Robert Fiske was appointed special prosecutor in January 1994 by Attorney General
Janet Reno to investigate the Whitewater matter. E.g., Michael Isikoff, Whitewater Special
Counsel Promises 'Thorough' Probe, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1994, at Al; David Johnston, Counsel
Granted a Broad Mandate in Clinton Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1994, at Al. When the
independent counsel statute was reauthorized on June 30, 1994, however, the Special
Court removed Fiske and appointed Starr. E.g., Stephen Labaton, The Whitewater Inquiy:
The Decision; Judges Appoint New Prosecutor for Whitewater, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1994, § 1, at 1;
Susan Schmidt, Judges Replace Fiske as Whitewater Counsel; Ex-Solicitor General Starr to Take Over
Probe, WASH. PosT, Aug. 6, 1994, at Al.
25. See Donald C. Smaltz, The Independent Counsel: A View from Inside, 86 GEO. L.J. 2307,
2323-24 (1998) (noting the eighteen publicly identified independent counsels that have
been appointed under the independent counsel statute).
26. See Donald C. Smaltz, On the Need for Independent Counsel to Conduct Investigations, 47
U. KAN. L. REv. 573, 573 (1999) ("The [independent counsel] legislation was a result of
the country's experience in the so-called 'Watergate' matter . . ").
27. See S. ReP. No. 103-101, at 5-6 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 748, 749 (dis-
cussing the impetus for the original independent counsel law).
28. Dash, supra note 14, at 2085.
29. See William Michael Treanor, Independent Counsel and Vigorous Investigation and Prose-
cution, 61 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 155 (1998) (setting forth Walsh's professional
qualifications).
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ment, however, the public had come to distrust him. ° Walsh faced
allegations of vindictiveness, unfairness, and prosecutorial abuse, and
this resulted in general public support for allowing the independent
counsel statute to lapse."
Kenneth Starr was appointed independent counsel in 1994,2 and
at that time any objective observer would have been impressed with
his credentials. Starr was a former solicitor general, a former judge on
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, and a highly regarded attorney who was known for his moderate
views.33 In November 1998, when Starr appeared before the House
Judiciary Committee to discuss proposed articles of impeachment, his
reputation was in tatters and his public image of fairness and objectiv-
ity was nonexistent.3 4
Whether Walsh or Starr made prosecutorial misjudgments is, per-
haps, worthy of professional debate. It should be noted, however, that
both Walsh and Starr had an office composed of many professional
federal prosecutors-as is the case with all independent counsels.3 3
In any case, their tattered reputations were not the results of any possi-
ble mistakes; rather, they were the results of organized and often vi-
cious attacks on the independent counsels and their offices.36
30. See Dash, supra note 14, at 2085-86 (explaining how the Iran-Contra investigation
tainted Walsh's reputation).
31. See id. (noting that the unpopularity of Walsh's investigation led to the lapsing of
the independent counsel statute).
32. See supra note 24.
33. See RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND
TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 66 (1999) (listing the qualifications of Ken Starr); Rob Atkin-
son, Lucifer's Fiasco: Lawyers, Liars, and L'Affaire Lewinsky, 68 FoRDHAM L. REV. 567, 574-75 &
n.22 (1999) (observing Starr's "many admirable, even epic qualities").
34. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Learning the Wrong Lessons from History: Why There Must Be an
Independent Counsel Law, 5 WIDENER L. SvMP. J. 1, 15 (2000) (aligning the public's associa-
tion of independent counsels with the perceived abuses of Kenneth Starr).
35. See Howard, supra note 11, at 96 (explaining that the federal prosecutors called
upon to assist in independent counsel investigations were selected based upon their "expe-
rience in federal investigations and their ability to provide a typical federal investigatory
approach to the independent counsel's office").
36. One knowledgeable commentator explained:
Independent counsel differ from other federal prosecutors... in that indepen-
dent counsel are appointed to investigate alleged wrongdoing by a President or
one of the President's senior officials. This kind of investigation inevitably trig-
gers the powerful public relations mill of the President. The result is a barrage of
attacks against the independent counsel disseminated through leaks to favored
reporters, planned critical statements by chosen political spokespersons, and
sometimes in accusations by the President, himself. Once these orchestrated at-
tacks become public, the nature of the media is such that every newspaper and
television station seems compelled to cover the attacks. This press coverage fre-
quently leads to editorials critical of the investigation and fuels the general public
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Unfortunately, an independent counsel who is selected to investi-
gate a president will become fair game as a political adversary to that
president's administration." When the president is the target, de-
stroying the independent counsel's credibility and integrity becomes
an understandable defensive goal of the White House. Obviously, if
the public becomes convinced that the independent counsel is a parti-
san figure, out to destroy the president, then the entire independent
counsel's office cannot perform its duty-to conduct an investigation
that has the trust and confidence of the public.38 In his testimony to
the House Judiciary Committee, Kenneth Starr attempted to defend
his colleagues in the OIC, but to no avail.39 Indeed, he used the bar-
rage of unanswered public attacks from the White House as a reason
for his personal opposition to the reauthorization of the independent
counsel statute.4 °
perception that something has gone terribly wrong with the independent counsel
statute. Even more troubling, these attacks are based on a hopelessly skewed per-
ception of the investigation. Because the independent counsel and his staff are
required to work secretly during their investigation, they are prohibited from re-
sponding fully to these attacks. Thus, an influential editorial lambasting an inde-
pendent counsel may have little factual support, but may rely instead on the
spiraling propaganda daily generated by "sources close to the investigation" and
reporters and editors competing with other newspapers to keep the story alive as
long as possible.
Dash, supra note 14, at 2080; see also Smaltz, supra note 25, at 2333 ("As a political figure,
[an independent counsel] will-like it or not-most likely be caught up in the Washington
political swirl.... [T] he subjects of his investigation may choose to go public in an effort
to turn public opinion against the investigation and 'chill' witnesses from cooperating.").
37. See supra note 36.
38. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
39. See Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton: The Evidentiary Record Pursuant to
S. Res. 16, Vol. IX S. Doc. No. 106-3, at 27 (1999) (statement of Kenneth Starr, Indepen-
dent Counsel) (responding to alleged White House attacks on prosecutors who serve in
the independent counsel's office).
40. Starr articulated this point in his first public speech after resigning as independent
counsel. The speech, given on November 4, 1999, was entitled, "Lessons Learned from the
Recent Past." Lesson number one, as noted by Starr, is as follows:
The institutions fashioned at the convention in Philadelphia 212 years ago stood
the test of time, because their structure is undergirded by an exquisitely thought-
out, quintessentially American political philosophy. The idea we learn as school-
children: government should be balanced, with appropriate divisions and checks,
with accountability clearly resting where the power has been placed.
The Independent Counsel statute, under which I served ... fragmented ac-
countability, so that an Administration, whether Republican or Democrat, was not
held fully and clearly accountable for its actions. Of particular importance in my
experience was the statute's removal of the appointment power from the hands of
the Attorney General, and placing it instead in the hands of three federal judges.
The result was the worst of all worlds. The Attorney General-speaking generi-
cally-had no incentive to support an independent counsel. In fact, the structure
created exactly the opposite-incentives to stand in the way, incentives to injure
[VOL. 60:26
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Interestingly, if Walsh or Starr had committed any of the offenses
charged against them, they could have been removed from office. 41
But, of course, once an independent counsel has been demonized,
there is no need (from a defensive viewpoint) to seek his removal; he
is no longer a serious threat.
It is instructive to compare the fates of the two independent
counsels who investigated presidents with the fates of the three special
prosecutors who were appointed by attorneys general to investigate
presidents. Archibald Cox was appointed special prosecutor by Attor-
ney General Elliot Richardson in 1972 to investigate allegations
against President Nixon's administration.42 Cox was a Democrat, a
former solicitor general under President Kennedy,4" and was consid-
ered an enemy by the Nixon White House. White House public criti-
cism of him was muted, however, as he was the attorney general's
appointment and he served under the attorney general pursuant to
special regulations issued by the Department of Justice. Cox was not
dismissed because of attacks against his integrity or because of alleged
partisanship. He was dismissed because he refused to obey the Presi-
dent's order not to subpoena the "White House tapes."44 Attorney
General Richardson defended the Special Prosecutor, and resigned
rather than dismissing Cox.45 Deputy Attorney General Ruckelshaus
also defended Cox and resigned because of his proposed dismissal.46
Archibald Cox left as a public hero, with his reputation enhanced.47
Cox was replaced by Leon Jaworski, who successfully completed the
and, above all, incentives to sit neutrally on the sidelines when the independent
counsel, and even career prosecutors who were on assignment from the Justice
Department, came under assault.
... [The Attorney General] should be able to choose an outside prosecu-
tor .... Let the Attorney General decide, and then hold her accountable for that
choice. That's the way business works, it's the way education should work and it is
emphatically the way that the Executive Branch of our government should work.
Starr, supra note 21, at 350.
41. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing how an attorney general can
remove an independent counsel).
42. See GoRmLEv, supra note 22, at 232-46 (discussing the appointment of Archibald
Cox as special prosecutor).
43. See POSNER, supra note 33, at 66 (noting Cox's Democratic leanings and his service
as solicitor general under President Kennedy).
44. See GORMLEY, supra note 22, at 338-58 (describing the "Saturday Night Massacre"
and the dismissal of Cox as special prosecutor).
45. See id. at 354-56 (describing the resignation of Attorney General Richardson).
46. Dash, supra note 14, at 2077.
47. See GORMLEY, supra note 22, at 378-79 (discussing the positive reception received by
Cox after being dismissed); POSNER, supra note 33, at 66 (noting that "Cox's conduct as
special prosecutor is widely admired").
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Watergate investigation.48 Jaworski's reputation was similarly en-
hanced, and the executive branch did not publicly attack his
integrity.49
Robert Fiske was appointed special prosecutor by Attorney Gen-
eral Janet Reno in January 1994 to investigate the Whitewater allega-
tions against President Clinton, as well as other matters dealing with
the White House.5" After serving six months, the Special Court re-
placed Fiske with Starr, pursuant to the reauthorized independent
counsel statute. 51 Like Starr, Fiske was a member of the Republican
party, and had served as solicitor general under a Republican adminis-
tration. 52 Fiske, however, was not publicly attacked by White House
spokespeople as a partisan Republican out to get the President. His
tenure was short, but during his time in office he was the Attorney
General's appointee, and she could not and would not have permitted
such attacks. I submit that had the independent counsel statute not
been reauthorized in 1994, and had Fiske remained as special prose-
cutor, no public attacks would have been mounted against him, even
if he had, at the request of the Attorney General, investigated the
Monica Lewinsky allegations. The Attorney General would not have
tolerated the executive branch attacking the integrity of a federal of-
ficer whom she appointed, and who was responsible to her.
The main arguments made against the independent counsel stat-
ute are that the prosecutor is not accountable, and is not constrained
by limits on time and money.53 The lack of support for the indepen-
dent counsel statute, however, does not stem from the above criti-
48. See GORMLEY, supra note 22, at 381, 385 (discussing the appointment of Jaworski
and his successful efforts to obtain the White House tapes).
49. See JAMES DOYLE, NOT ABOVE THE LAw: THE BATrLES OF WATERGATE PROSECUTORS
COX ANDJAwoRsKi 374-76 (1977) (discussingJaworski's reception in the media upon leav-
ing office). See generally id. at 339-76 (discussing Jaworski's departure from office).
50. See supra note 24 (discussing the appointment of Robert Fiske).
51. See supra note 24 (discussing the appointment of Kenneth Starr after the
reauthorization of the Independent Counsel Act).
52. POSNER, supra note 33, at 66.
53. See, e.g., Dash, supra note 14, at 2081-84 (making both arguments); Joseph E. diGe-
nova, The Independent Counsel Act: A Good Time to End a Bad Era, 86 GEO. L.J. 2299, 2301
(1998) (arguing that the independent counsel lacks accountability and stating "(w]hat a
dangerous creature we have now loosed upon our system of checks and balances: an inde-
pendent counsel, removable only for cause, who in a real sense does not answer to Con-
gress, the executive, or the judiciary, and, worst of all, is in no way accountable to the
people"); Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit, supra note 9, at 1584
(statement of Congressman Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, House Judiciary Committee) ("I
think, for myself, I don't like the notion of creating a legal Frankenstein who is accounta-
ble to nobody, with an unlimited bank account, with a charter that is as comprehensive as
many independent counsels have treated it-it just lacks accountability.").
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cisms. The reason that the independent counsel statute failed to
sustain public and congressional support is, again, that no one and no
institution was responsible for the independent counsel. When an in-
dependent counsel investigates a president, he stands alone amidst a
storm of criticism. Regardless of what political party controls the
White House, it is a simple fact of political life that an independent
counsel investigating a president will be subjected to an overwhelming
campaign of public criticism. The independent counsel's options to
counter these attacks, however, are limited under Department of Jus-
tice guidelines regarding public comments.54
What further confuses the public's view of this constitutionally
ambiguous office is that the Department of Justice, as it did in the
Starr investigation, can take an adversarial position in court to the in-
dependent counsel.55 For example, during the Lewinsky investiga-
tion, the Clinton administration attempted to prevent the Secret
Service from being forced to testify against the President.56 In so do-
ing, the administration "created a legal conundrum, one in which the
United States, as sovereign, found itself doing judicial battle with
itself."
5 7
54. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(f) (1) (1994) ("An independent counsel shall, except to the
extent that to do so would be inconsistent with the purposes of this chapter, comply with
the written or other established policies of the Department of Justice respecting enforce-
ment of the criminal laws."); 28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (2000) (detailing the limited amount of
information ajustice Department prosecutor may divulge to the press). An excellent state-
ment on this problem is as follows:
If the present public dissatisfaction with the independent counsel statute . . . is
based on the crediting of the frequent vitriolic attacks on individual independent
counsel reported by the news media, it is misplaced and misinformed. Such at-
tacks are basically unreliable because they cannot be rooted in knowledge of the
actual conduct of a particular independent counsel and her staff, who are under
the restrictions of grand jury secrecy and professional responsibility. Instead,
these attacks are usually fueled by defense strategy to vilify the prosecutor for the
purpose of weakening her investigation. Journalists, acting as conduits, and not
the filters their ethics require them to be, routinely report these attacks, lending
credibility to them and thus shaping the opinions and perceptions of the public.
As a result, the public perception is based on a myth, which, unfortunately, may
contaminate the reality in the office of the independent counsel through the chil-
ling impact on professional prosecutors by constant, and from their point of view,
unearned public condemnation.
Dash, supra note 14, at 2094-95.
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(i) (1994) ("Each independent counsel . . . and the persons
appointed by that independent counsel . . . are separate from and independent of the
Department of Justice ... ."); supra note 40 (noting Starr's critique of the Justice Depart-
ment's potentially adversarial position in independent counsel investigations).
56. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
57. Smaltz, supra note 26, at 580. Although the D.C. Circuit ultimately rejected the
administration's attempt to "do battle with itself," In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1079, the
animosity between the Department of Justice and the OIC remained.
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The problem, therefore, with the independent counsel statute
was not the independent counsel's lack of accountability. It also was
not the independent counsel's ability to exert great amounts of power
or to spend unlimited amounts of money investigating executive
wrongdoing. The flaw was that the statute separated the independent
counsel completely from the executive branch by giving the judiciary
the authority to appoint an independent counsel and to establish his
jurisdiction.5" Because of the inherent flaw in the independent coun-
sel statute, it is impossible for an independent counsel to investigate a
president or members of the White House staff, and to obtain the
public trust that is essential to the success of such an investigation.
Hopefully, there will be no future need for independent investi-
gations of the White House. History, however, teaches us that inevita-
bly another problem will occur. Serious allegations will be made,
regardless of their legitimacy, against a president or member of the
White House staff. Faith in our constitutional system requires a
method to resolve such serious charges. Congressional investigations
can be helpful in satisfying the public, but they alone cannot win com-
plete public support.59
Good intentions created the constitutionally ambiguous indepen-
dent counsel law, and the questionable decision of Morrison v. Olson60
gave it life, albeit short-lived. Proposals that tinker with the wording
of the statute to respond to its critics will not solve its fatal flaw.
It is unfortunate that the dismissal of Archibald Cox and the re-
sulting "Saturday Night Massacre" in 1973 discredited the use of the
special prosecutor for high level investigations. Were it not for this
incident, Congress likely would have never created a judicially ap-
pointed independent counsel in 1978.
Special prosecutors have a long and successful history.61 The at-
torney general has the unquestioned authority to appoint a special
prosecutor. Nothing, however, prevents Congress from responding to
public criticism of a "high level" investigation by statutorily granting
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(1) ("Upon receipt of an application [to appoint an indepen-
dent counsel], the division of the court shall appoint an appropriate independent counsel
and shall define that independent counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction.").
59. The Senate Watergate hearings and the impeachment process in the House of Rep-
resentatives certainly made possible the successful conclusion of the Archibald Cox and
Leon Jaworski criminal investigations, but it is not clear that in today's post-Clinton, politi-
cally charged environment, a congressional investigation would even be helpful to a special
prosecutor.
60. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
61. See Howard, supra note 11, at 99-102 (discussing the merits of past special prosecu-
tor investigations).
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itself the authority to request the appointment of a special prosecu-
tor.6 2 Congress could, for example, require the attorney general to
appoint a special prosecutor under certain circumstances.63 Using
the language of the Independent Counsel Act, Congress could also
ensure that a special prosecutor has the authority to investigate high-
ranking officials when a conflict of interest may exist in the Depart-
ment of Justice.64 Congress can require the attorney general to issue
regulations granting special prosecutors both prosecutorial authority
similar to that found in the independent counsel statute, 65 and similar
removal restrictions. 6 Further, Congress could statutorily require
that a special prosecutor, nominated by the attorney general, be con-
firmed by a majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee, or, for that
matter, by a majority of the entire Senate. Indeed, Congress can statu-
torily require the attorney general to issue regulations that, in effect,
mirror the requirements of the independent counsel statute.
Many critics may be concerned with the apparent power of the
executive branch to peremptorily dismiss a special prosecutor (as in
the Archibald Cox dismissal). What is forgotten by many of these crit-
ics, however, is that a properly issued regulation, promulgated pursu-
ant to statutory authority, has the force of law that agencies must
comply with.67 In fact, a federal court later determined that the Cox
dismissal was illegal due to a violation of the Justice Department regu-
lation that governs special prosecutors.68
62. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18 (authorizing Congress to pass "Laws which shall be
necessary and proper to carry into Execution" Congress's delegated powers).
63. See 28 U.S.C. § 5 9 2(g) (1) (stating that Congress, under certain circumstances, can
formally request that the attorney general apply for the appointment of an independent
counsel).
64. See id. § 591 (b) (granting the attorney general the authority to investigate the presi-
dent, the vice president, and high-level executive officials); id § 591 (c) (1) (detailing the
attorney general's authority to conduct a preliminary investigation when "an investigation
or prosecution of a person by the Department ofJustice may result in a personal, financial,
or political conflict of interest").
65. See supra note 15 (noting the prosecutorial authority of independent counsels).
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(a) (stating that an independent counsel can only be removed
"for good cause, physical or mental disability.... or any other condition that substantially
impairs the performance of such independent counsel's duties").
67. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295-96 (1979) ("It has been established
in a variety of contexts that properly promulgated, substantive agency regulations have the
'force and effect of law.' This doctrine is so well established that agency regulations imple-
menting federal statutes have been held to pre-empt state law under the Supremacy
Clause." (citation omitted)).
68. Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 108 (D.D.C. 1973) ("The firing of Archibald Cox
in the absence of a finding of extraordinary impropriety was in clear violation of an ex-
isting Justice Department regulation having the force of law and was therefore illegal.").
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Retaining the historic special prosecutor concept is important be-
cause the special prosecutor is unambiguously a part of the executive
branch-within the Department of Justice. When the need for an in-
vestigation arises, the attorney general would have to appoint a special
prosecutor and issue regulations that protect his or her indepen-
dence. Once an attorney general appoints a qualified member of the
private bar to the special prosecutor position, the attorney general
then would have a responsibility to this subordinate federal official.
Replacing the OIC by a statutorily mandated special prosecutor
would not create a perfect system for presidential investigations. It
would have many of the imperfections of the independent counsel
statute. For example, the triggering requirement would still be vague
and left to the attorney general's discretion. Also, a special prosecu-
tor, as a subordinate of the attorney general, would not be able to do
some things an independent counsel could do.69 However, a compar-
ison of the Cox, Jaworski, and (to an extent) Fiske investigations to
the Walsh and Starr investigations proves that a protected special pros-
ecutor investigation can be more effective than an independent coun-
sel investigation. In 1998, a well-known defender of the OIC made an
observation that perfectly demonstrates this point. He observed:
An illustration may be useful to put in context the publicly
reported disapproval of the independent counsel statute.
For the purpose of this illustration, I will switch the roles of
Archibald Cox and Lawrence Walsh. Assume that Walsh, not
Cox, was picked by Attorney General Elliot Richardson to be
the Watergate Special Prosecutor. I submit that Walsh would
have performed his investigative responsibilities similarly to
the way Cox did, and he would have reached the same con-
frontation with President Nixon. He would have been fired
and gone down in history as a great American hero who cou-
rageously stood up for justice and integrity. On the other
hand, assume that Cox had been selected by the Special Divi-
sion of the court to be the independent counsel in the Iran-
Contra matter. I submit that Cox would have performed his
69. For example, Starr's judicial battle with the Department ofJustice over compelling
the testimony of Secret Service agents could not happen under a special prosecutor law.
This is not necessarily a bad thing. See Smaltz, supra note 26, at 580-81 (discussing the
dispute over Secret Service testimony and implying that such a court battle could only
occur between parties from independent governmental offices). Appointing a special
prosecutor who is subordinate to the attorney general would also cure the fear expressed
by many, but articulated best by justice Scalia, that "[w ] hat would normally be regarded as
a technical violation.. . may ... assume the proportions of an indictable offense... [to
an] independent counsel and staff ... with nothing else to do but to investigate you."
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 732 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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investigative and prosecution responsibilities similarly to the
way Walsh did. Like Walsh, he would have been stonewalled
and undercut by the President and the Attorney General, un-
dermined by the Congress's misuse of its immunity power,
and exposed to vicious attacks reported in newspapers and
on television made by his opponents and others too ready to
believe what they read or heard. Thus, in my illustration,
Cox, instead of being revered as an American hero, would
have been remembered as a failure and an abuser of power.
Public disapproval of the independent counsel statute is not
the fault of the statute or any particular independent coun-
sel. Instead, it is the product of marketing-an image woven
largely of public relations and reinforced by the press.7"
CONCLUSION
The standard criticism of the independent counsel statute-that
it permits inflated expenses, overzealous prosecutions, and a lack of
accountability-misses the essential problem with the concept of an
independent counsel statute: that this constitutionally ambiguous of-
fice has no institutional home. The independent counsel is ap-
pointed by the judiciary, but is not of the judiciary; he is a federal
prosecutor, but is not of the Justice Department or the executive
branch.
Independent counsels that set out to investigate a president are
therefore fair game. The vast White House public relations machin-
ery can launch a nationwide attack on their integrity and "partisan
bias," and they can be vilified beyond redemption.7 1 The result is that
70. Dash, supra note 14, at 2095. I would only add that Independent Counsel Starr
could be included in this observation-with the same result.
71. Assuming a reauthorization of the Independent Counsel Act occurs, one must won-
der, after the Walsh and Starr examples, how many distinguished members of the bar
would be willing and available to accept an independent counsel appointment.
An example of what any new independent counsel could expect occurred in August
2000. After Ken Starr resigned as independent counsel, the Special Court appointed Rob-
ert W. Ray, a relatively unknown professional prosecutor, to complete the Starr investiga-
tion. E.g., Lorraine Adams, Starr to Resign; Deputy to Assume Counsel Role, WASH. POST, Oct.
15, 1999, at A6. On August 17, the day Vice President Gore gave his acceptance speech to
the Democratic Convention, the Associated Press released a story that Ray had impaneled a
grand jury to investigate President Clinton for possible criminal offenses. Pete Yost, New
Grand Juiy Assembled to Probe Clinton in Lewinsky Scandal, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 17, 2000.
Immediately, Democrats called this a plot of the Independent Counsel to hurt Vice Presi-
dent Gore and help the Republicans. See, e.g., Susan Schmidt & David Vise, New GrandJury
Probe Set for Lewinsky Case; Criminal Charges for Clinton to Be Weighed, WASH. POST, Aug. 18,
2000, at Al ("'The timing of the leak reeks to high heaven. Given the past record of the
independent counsel, it's hardly surprising,' said White House spokesman Jake Siewert.");
id. ("Gore campaign spokesman Chris Lehane said, 'The timing of this raises questions.'");
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they cannot fulfill the essential purpose of the independent counsel
statute-to insure public confidence and trust in their government.
72
A special prosecutor-appointed by an attorney general and pro-
tected by appropriate congressionally-mandated regulations-would
be a federal prosecutor within the Department ofJustice and the exec-
utive branch. The special prosecutor would not be fair game for
White House attacks because any such attacks would also be aimed at
the attorney general and the Department of Justice. Attorneys gen-
eral would have to protect and defend their subordinate and their
appointee. Indeed, attorneys general, who are usually responsible
professionals, would caution the White House against making such
attacks, as their own professional reputations would be at stake. Fur-
ther, if allies of the White House, in the media or in Congress, were to
voice unfair personal attacks against the special prosecutors, the attor-
ney general would have the duty (and the desire) to defend against
such abuse. A special prosecutor would not be left "to twist in the
wind."
A New Grand Jury Looks at Clinton's Past, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2000, at A23 [hereinafter New
Grand Jury] ("Rahm Emanuel, a former senior adviser to Mr. Clinton, said the news of Mr.
Ray's office was 'brazenly political' and predicted it would cause a backlash against Repub-
licans."). The uproar over Ray's alleged lack of integrity continued for two days. Even the
Republicans attacked Ray for allegedly leaking the story on Vice President Gore's "big day."
See, e.g., New Grand Jury, supra, at A23 ("Karen P. Hughes, communications director for
Gov. George W. Bush of Texas, the Republican presidential nominee, called the timing [of
the release of the grand jury information] unfortunate. 'We think the timing was wrong,'
Ms. Hughes said. 'It was simply not appropriate for this type of news to come out on Al
Gore's big day.' "); id. ("'I think the timing is terrible,' said Rep. Nancy L. Johnson, a
Republican moderate from Connecticut. 'I wish [Ray] hadn't done this in a political sea-
son."'). Fortunately (in this instance) for Independent Counsel Ray's office, Judge Rich-
ard D. Cudahy stepped forward and accepted responsibility for the leak. Judge Cudahy
stated that he had "inadvertently" let out the information on the grand jury to a reporter.
E.g., Susan Schmidt, Judge Was Source of Clinton Jury Story; Leak 'Inadvertent,' Carter Nominee
Says, WASH. PosT, Aug. 19, 2000, at Al. The OIC was "innocent" of any wrongdoing. Once
again, however, public mistrust of the OIC was raised and an independent counsel's repu-
tation was tarnished.
72. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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